Charting the downfall of Syracuse basketball after 10 years in the ACC

Ten years ago, Syracuse joined the ACC in a move that affected the athletic department, and the school as a whole, in countless ways.

Over that time, the Orange basketball program has devolved from a team that was a near-perennial automatic participant in the NCAA Tournament to a team that has only made four NCAA appearances in the last nine seasons (and would have very likely missed the one canceled by a pandemic). In those four tournament appearances, they have ranged between an 8-seed and an 11-seed, even squeaking in on one occasion as a participant in “The First Four”.

In the preceding 15 seasons going back to the 1999-2000 campaign, the team made the tourney a dozen times, never earning a place lower than a 5-seed in those 12 appearances. Those 15 seasons saw the team win a title, make another Final Four, an Elite Eight, and four Sweet Sixteens.

In fact, the program closed out their Big East membership with a five-year run that included a pair of Sweet Sixteens, an Elite Eight, and a Final Four, as well as ringing up three of Jim Boeheim’s six 30-win seasons as head coach. Each of the last four teams in that span (from 2009-2010 through 2012-2013) rank in the top nine in school history in Simple Rating System at basketballreference.com, a peak run only the Orange squads of the late 1980’s can stake a claim to.

Since that time, things have not been quite as glossy for SU.

While they started their initial ACC campaign 25-0 and reached the top spot in the AP poll during each of the first three weeks of February, the Orange lost six of their next 11 games to close the season. Things were even worse a year later, as the program punished itself while being investigated by the NCAA, eventually losing eight scholarships over a four-year period.

The team devolved into a perennial NCAA bubble team from there, remaining that way through this past season. None of the last nine Syracuse teams finished better than two games over .500 in ACC play or won 65 percent of their games in a season, including hanging the only losing season on Boeheim’s coaching ledger. The maximum number of wins recorded by any SU team in that time is 23 on two occasions, both times aided by a surprisingly long postseason run, notching either three or four NCAA Tournament wins.

In 332 games since joining the ACC, Syracuse has posted a 200-132 record for a .602 winning percentage. Since they blew a pair of 13-point second half leads over Boston College in an overtime loss that ended that 25-0 start, they have a .570 winning percentage.

Since a decade is a nice round number, it provides a sensible time to look back and see what happened to the Orange since they changed conference membership. Perhaps we can decide if there is one clear reason for their slide or if a combination of things played into their failing success. There is plenty of statistical data to look at and determine what actually happened over the last ten years and how Syracuse played well (and how they played poorly), as well as if they were set up for success based on how they needed to play.

Going back well before their first decade of ACC membership, the Orange basketball team revolved around Jim Boeheim and his 2-3 zone defense. The defense is praised for being unique in college basketball for both the way it is deployed and the prototypical players recruited to play it. It can ideally be used to push three-point shooters out beyond their comfort zones, to create traps in various places (the corners of the floor, the short corners outside the key, near the break in the three-point arc, and at the top of the key), or to collapse on big men inside and snuff out the basket area.

Its deployment depends upon opponent strategy and personnel, as well as game flow. Are there multiple three-point shooters who must be defended? Then the guards play a step above the arc and the forwards come up above the break on the wings. Does the opponent have a dangerous big man as their focal point? Then the forwards play closer to the baseline to help the center by being ready to collapse for double-teams. What about an opponent who has someone operate at the foul line area? Well, depending on that player’s abilities at shooting, driving, and passing, the center will come up as a primary defender with the forwards squeezing behind to help at the rim or the center will sag, allowing the forwards remain closer to the corners of the court.

The success of the zone is predicated on long, fluid athletes backstopped by a center capable of altering or blocking shots. Guards and wings are taller than average for their positions with even longer wingspans that enable disruption of passing lanes and deflections, quick rotations, and hard closeouts on perimeter shooters. Centers are generally near seven feet in height with longer wingspans to block shots inside and, in recent years, contest corner threes on rotations. Regardless of position, the players are ideally lean and lightweight with reliance on footspeed and agility over strength and bulk. The term “prototypical Syracuse forward” conjures the immediate image of a player who looks like Hakim Warrick – 6’8” and long-armed, with a wiry body that can explode off the hardwood.

The zone was also a traditional hallmark of its NCAA Tournament success, even when the team struggled during the season. Going back to the 1999-2000 season, the team posted a 33-15 mark in NCAA tourney games, good for a .688 winning percentage.

The 2-3 zone defense was always noted as being difficult for unfamiliar opponents to adequately prepare for on short notice and the program’s record gave evidence to that, as well. In that span, the Orange were 16-4 in NCAA Tournament games when playing someone on two days’ notice. When foes had three or more days to prepare for the zone, SU was still good, but not great, posting a 17-11 mark (.607 winning percentage) in those games.

That trend held even in recent years when Syracuse struggled to get to the tourney. In the last nine seasons, the Orange were a perfect 6-0 in games when their NCAA Tournament opponents had two days’ notice. Opponents went 3-4 when they had at least three days to prepare for SU.

As the game of basketball has evolved in recent years, the most noteworthy shift to Syracuse is the overall trend toward three-point shooting. As more players shoot more three-pointers, more players merit being guarded at the three-point line and beyond, stretching the zone defense and creating space on the inside. With shooters around the arc, sharp rotations are a must and necessitate players who fit the traditional athletic profile on the floor to keep up with them in an effort to follow a basketball being whipped around the arc.

When the personnel on the roster does not match the athletic profile, the zone gets stressed even more. Players who cannot rotate quickly, cut off passing lanes, or contest shots create deficiencies that are difficult to overcome. Even when a player has all those attributes, but is not focused on carrying out those defensive responsibilities, the defense suffers. Playing the 2-3 zone at Syracuse asks for both body and mind.

The recent weight of three-point shooting is an easy target to point at when discussing the outcome of a game. “They gave up too many threes” is a simple statement to make when Syracuse loses. And, to be sure, giving up a boatload of threes certainly makes winning a game harder.

The numbers in both three-pointers attempted and made by SU opponents have generally increased over the course of the past decade, as well as the opponents’ percentage of three pointers out of total field goal attempts:

2013-2014: 6.85 threes on 19.88 attempts/game (34.5 percent shooting, 40.5 percent 3FG rate)

2014-2015: 6.55 threes on 20.81 attempts/game (31.5 percent shooting, 37.4 percent 3FG rate)

2015-2016: 7.00 threes on 22.81 attempts/game (30.7 percent shooting, 39.7 percent 3FG rate)

2016-2017: 8.68 threes on 25.38 attempts/game (34.2 percent shooting, 42.8 percent 3FG rate)

2017-2018: 7.81 threes on 24.57 attempts/game (31.8 percent shooting, 44.4 percent 3FG rate)

2018-2019: 8.65 threes on 26.29 attempts/game (32.9 percent shooting, 48.1 percent 3FG rate)

2019-2020: 9.00 threes on 27.97 attempts/game (32.2 percent shooting, 47.9 percent 3FG rate)

2020-2021: 8.64 threes on 27.25 attempts/game (31.7 percent shooting, 44.3 percent 3FG rate)

2021-2022: 10.15 threes on 30.73 attempts/game (33.0 percent shooting, 48.7 percent 3FG rate)

2022-2023: 10.28 threes on 29.94 attempts/game (34.3 percent shooting, 48.3 percent 3FG rate)

Further, here is a look at threes attempted per possession, using possessions per game from Ken Pomeroy’s adjusted tempo:

2013-2014: 19.88 attempts in 59.6 possessions/game (33.4 percent)

2014-2015: 20.81 attempts in 65.8 possessions/game (31.6 percent)

2015-2016: 22.81 attempts in 65.0 possessions/game (35.1 percent)

2016-2017: 25.38 attempts in 66.8 possessions/game (38.0 percent)

2017-2018: 24.57 attempts in 62.9 possessions/game (39.1 percent)

2018-2019: 26.29 attempts in 66.1 possessions/game (39.8 percent)

2019-2020: 27.97 attempts in 68.3 possessions/game (41.0 percent)

2020-2021: 27.25 attempts in 68.6 possessions/game (39.7 percent)

2021-2022: 30.73 attempts in 67.6 possessions/game (45.5 percent)

2022-2023: 29.94 attempts in 67.5 possessions/game (44.4 percent)

It is crystal clear that opponents have increased the frequency with which they have taken three-point shots against Syracuse’s 2-3 zone. However, is that automatically a bad thing?

Not necessarily.

When looking at the 25 games in the last decade where an SU opponent has shot at least 60 percent of their field goals from three-point range, the Orange have actually done pretty well. They are 16-9 in those games, good for a .640 winning percentage. While that is not an outstanding mark, it is better than how Syracuse has performed as a whole in the last ten years (.602 winning percentage since joining the ACC).

While those 16 wins include a number of wins against overmatched opponents early in the season (just as any statistical subset of Orange wins likely does), it also includes a win over Villanova and a pair of NCAA Tournament wins against Arizona State and Baylor.

Expand that stat to the 63 games where a foe takes at least 53.4 percent of their shots from three and that record improves to 48-15, a .762 winning percentage. This expansion adds a pair of victories at Duke, another win against Arizona State, and two more tourney wins over Michigan State and San Diego State.

And those opponents have shot 32.8 percent from three in those 63 games. For comparison’s sake, SU opponents have shot 32.7 percent beyond the arc in the last decade.

Conversely, the Orange have really struggled when their foes ignore the three-point line. There are 36 games in the past decade in which an SU foe has taken fewer than 30 percent of their field goal attempts from deep. SU is an even 18-18 in those games with all those losses coming against Power 6 conference teams. They have picked up some good wins in those games, including three over both North Carolina and North Carolina State. In an odd quirk, Georgia Tech has given Syracuse fits by shooting inside, beating them five times in seven games when they focus on two-point shots.

Increasing the opponents’ three-point attempt rate to 34.5 percent and SU gets even worse. Using that benchmark expands the number of games to 64 and the Orange are 28-36 in those outings. It is getting more difficult to believe that the Orange forcing three-point attempts in the zone is a real problem.

Let’s get back to the sheer number of three-pointers the Orange has allowed their opponents to make.

In the last ten seasons, the average Syracuse opponent has made 8.33 three-pointers in a game, with the last two seasons really driving that number up (the average of the first eight seasons of the last decade is 7.88).

In the 332 games of the last decade, an opponent has made 12 or more threes 48 times. The Orange are 21-27 in those games, including victories over Virginia, Notre Dame, North Carolina State, Arizona State, and Duke. On 42 occasions, SU has permitted four of fewer treys, posting a 31-11 record in those contests, so simply limiting the number of threes does not translate to an automatic victory, just as giving up a truckload of triples does not automatically signal defeat.

Perhaps more telling in that first set of games where opponents rain threes all night is the importance of limiting the shooting percentage from beyond the arc. There is a more general trend of opponent three-point percentage being tied to whether or not SU wins when a team fills the cup from long distance.

In these 48 games where the opponent made at least a dozen threes, the Orange are 10-2 when they give up 38.7 percent or lower shooting from three-point range, meaning they forced a lot of threes on defense. As a reference point, a team allowing 38.7 percent shooting from beyond the arc would have ranked 357th in the nation this past season.

The two losses in that set of games were against Villanova, who shot 26.0 percent from three, and Duke, who hit 37.8 percent from deep. The real culprit in those losses? SU’s offense, as they mustered 53 and 59 points in those games, respectively.

Conversely, when Syracuse forces a very low shooting percentage from long range, they have a pretty sterling won-loss mark. The Orange have held opponents to 25.0 percent or lower on three-point shooting 68 times in the past decade. Unsurprisingly, they are 57-11 in those games.

Yes, forcing a lower three-point shooting percentage reduces the sheer number of threes allowed, but in the 22 games where SU has given up under 25.0 percent from three with the opponent making at least six threes (no opponent made more than nine treys in this subset), they are 21-1. The loss came in 2016 at North Carolina, 75-70, in a game where the Tar Heels made a half dozen treys on 24.0 percent shooting from deep, but grabbed 46.3 percent of potential offensive boards and held the Orange to 25.0 percent shooting from deep.

One takeaway to feel very comfortable with? It is almost never just one statistical shortcoming in a game that is the cause of an individual loss. For example, in the aforementioned Villanova loss, in addition to giving up 13 triples and scoring just 53 points, the Orange were terrible at rebounding on defense, letting the Wildcats grab 51.9 percent off their own misses. Duke made 14 threes in beating SU and grabbed an above-average 39.4 percent of potential offensive rebounds, which is above average, but the likely biggest culprit in SU’s loss was their measly 5-of-29 mark (17.2 percent) from three.

While the shortcomings of the 2-3 zone have been amplified in the modern era, the effect of increased three-point attempts or even three-point field goals allowed may be overstated. While the number of made threes can definitely be problematic, it seems that being able to force three-point shots that are farther away, contested, or late in the shot clock that lower the opponent’s shooting percentage is still a key function of the 2-3 zone that drives team success. Thus, players on the top line and wings of the zone who display the ability and willingness to contest threes are growing in importance.

In recent seasons, the Orange have generally followed the national trend and shifted toward shooting more three-pointers. Here are their three-point rates over the last decade:

2013-2014: 4.91 threes on 14.85 attempts/game (33.1 percent shooting, 27.0 percent 3FG rate)

2014-2015: 5.00 threes on 20.81 attempts/game (30.1 percent shooting, 29.0 percent 3FG rate)

2015-2016: 8.51 threes on 23.68 attempts/game (36.0 percent shooting, 42.1 percent 3FG rate)

2016-2017: 8.82 threes on 23.18 attempts/game (38.1 percent shooting, 40.4 percent 3FG rate)

2017-2018: 5.62 threes on 17.70 attempts/game (31.8 percent shooting, 32.8 percent 3FG rate)

2018-2019: 8.06 threes on 24.24 attempts/game (33.3 percent shooting, 43.2 percent 3FG rate)

2019-2020: 8.09 threes on 24.56 attempts/game (33.0 percent shooting, 42.1 percent 3FG rate)

2020-2021: 8.46 threes on 24.21 attempts/game (35.0 percent shooting, 40.6 percent 3FG rate)

2021-2022: 9.09 threes on 24.09 attempts/game (37.7 percent shooting, 39.2 percent 3FG rate)

2022-2023: 6.19 threes on 17.09 attempts/game (36.2 percent shooting, 29.0 percent 3FG rate)

There is normally a direct line between the number of triples attempted and the personnel on the roster, as well as the team’s pace of play. Trevor Cooney was the lone high-volume three-point shooter on the 2013-02014 team, but he was joined by Michael Gbinije the following season and Tyler Lydon and Malachi Richardson the year after that. Lydon played with Tyus Battle, John Gillon, and Andrew White III for the 2016-2017 campaign.

There was a reset the following year with Battle, Frank Howard, and Oshae Brissett as the only perimeter shooters on a team that leaned on defense and played at a snail’s pace. That trio was joined by Buddy Boeheim and Elijah Hughes the next season, starting a focus on perimeter shooting as players like Joe Girard III, Alan Griffin, Jimmy Boeheim, and Cole Swider cycled through.

This past season, Girard was left as the only high-volume three-point shooter as post-up player Jesse Edwards and slashing point guard Judah Mintz were the other two primary weapons in the mostly three-pronged offense.

In all, the Orange shot 34.6 percent from three-point range over the decade, which brings me to how three-point shooting has been important for them in that time. As a reminder, SU has given up 32.7 percent shooting from deep in the decade, as well.

Here is Syracuse’s year-to-year record when the Orange shoot 34 percent of better from three-point range while also holding their foe to 30 percent or worse from long range:

2013-2014: 5-0

2014-2015: 6-0

2015-2016: 6-0

2016-2017: 10-1

2017-2018: 5-1

2018-2019: 6-0

2019-2020: 6-1

2020-2021: 6-1

2021-2022: 7-2

2022-2023: 4-0

All told, SU is 61-6 (91.0 winning percentage) in the last decade when they have what is essentially an average three-point shooting game while holding their opponent to basically one less made trey than their average.

The catch is the two stats go hand-in-hand. The three Syracuse teams with the best three-point shooting percentages over the last decade finished with the worst records in that time. If anything, it seems that forcing a low shooting percentage from three-point range is of primary importance, then shooting well from deep supports it nicely.

Defensive rebounding is harped on as a shortcoming of the 2-3 zone. Players are more concerned with rebounding in their area than boxing out because they may not have an opposing player in their immediate vicinity. Factor in that three-pointers normally create longer rebounds due to the distance the shots are taken from and it is more difficult to rebound well out of the zone.

Over the last decade, the Orange have permitted their opponents to grab an average of 32.9 percent of all possible offensive rebounds. You can divide the games in that time into almost five equal groups based on their offensive rebounding rate allowed. It does show a fairly clear correlation between defensive rebounding and win percentage.

In the 66 games where opponent had greater than 40 percent offensive rebounding rate, SU was 23-43 (34.8 winning percentage). Oddly, Syracuse won their four games with their worst defensive rebounding percentage – at Pitt, against St. Bonaventure and North Carolina at home, and Michigan State in the NCAA Tournament.

In the 65 games where the Orange allowed an opponent offensive rebounding rate between 35.5 percent and 40 percent, they were 38-27 (58.5 winning percentage). They were also 38-27 (58.5 winning percentage) in the 65 games where they gave up an opponent offensive rebounding rate between 30.2 percent and 35.1 percent.

Their winning percentage ticked up when they gave up an opponent offensive rebounding rate between 24.4 percent and 30 percent, going 47-18 (.723 winning percentage). And it went up even more in their best 71 games, notching a 53-18 mark (.746 winning percentage) when the opponent offensive rebounding rate landed between 11.8 percent and 24.3 percent.

At their best at gathering defensive boards, SU’s record actually slacks off. When an opponent grabs fewer than 20 percent of potential offensive rebounds, the Orange are 15-7 (69.2 winning percentage). So, while they generally end up in the win column more often when they perform well on the glass, even their best work taking care of the defensive glass does not guarantee Syracuse a win.

In addition to forcing tough three-point shots, a hallmark of Syracuse’s 2-3 zone being successful is forcing turnovers, but particularly live-ball quick possession changes, namely steals and blocks, the latter not counting as turnovers. The Orange would historically generate fast break opportunities from these quick directional changes, but in more recent years, have often relied on the zone to slow the game down, nearly grinding the action to a halt.

By slowing the game down, SU would limit the sheer number of scoring opportunities, and with an effective zone, it would further limit opponent scoring. Another reason why they took the air out of the ball? NCAA scholarship penalties shortened the roster, which also shortened the number of players ready to contribute in games. As a result, Jim Boeheim opted for a slower pace of play so he could play the guys who were ready longer minutes.

And it worked.

Here is where Syracuse ranked in adjusted tempo at KenPom over the last decade, by number of possessions per game, national rank, NCAA Tournament result:

2013-2014: 59.6 possessions per game (344th) – second round

2014-2015: 65.8 possessions per game (100th)

2015-2016: 65.0 possessions per game (314th) – Final Four

2016-2017: 66.8 possessions per game (243rd)

2017-2018: 62.9 possessions per game (345th) – Sweet Sixteen

2018-2019: 66.1 possessions per game (257th) – first round

2019-2020: 68.3 possessions per game (179th)

2020-2021: 68.6 possessions per game (151st) – Sweet Sixteen

2021-2022: 67.6 possessions per game (144th)

2022-2023: 67.5 possessions per game (169th)

The four slowest-playing teams of the decade all made the tournament and the slowest-playing three of those teams experienced the most success. The 2020-2021 team is the outlier as the only team to play at a slightly faster than average tempo and make the tournament. They were the only team among the six fastest to make the dance and their focus on defense once they got there helped them win a couple games (that part is coming).

Here are the steal and block rates for SU over the last decade with their national rankings (steal rate is the percentage of opponent possessions that end in a steal, block rate is the percentage of opponent two-point shots the result in a blocked shot):

2013-2014: 13.1 percent steal rate – 4th nationally, 17.2 percent block rate – 4th nationally

2014-2015: 12.5 percent steal rate – 16th nationally, 14.6 percent block rate – 15th nationally

2015-2016: 12.4 percent steal rate – 7th nationally, 12.6 percent block rate – 37th nationally

2016-2017: 11.8 percent steal rate – 12th nationally, 13.8 percent block rate – 19th nationally

2017-2018: 10.7 percent steal rate – 36th nationally, 17.4 percent block rate – 3rd nationally

2018-2019: 12.1 percent steal rate – 14th nationally, 16.8 percent block rate – 2nd nationally

2019-2020: 10.8 percent steal rate – 56th nationally, 14.7 percent block rate – 12th nationally

2020-2021: 11.7 percent steal rate – 22nd nationally, 14.7 percent block rate – 9th nationally

2021-2022: 10.0 percent steal rate – 131st nationally, 11.6 percent block rate – 60th nationally

2022-2023: 10.9 percent steal rate – 68th nationally, 15.7 percent block rate – 2nd nationally

As you can see, it has almost always been effective at creating those takeaways, particularly blocks, and Jesse Edwards’ season-ending wrist injury in February 2022 certainly hurt that team.

Unsurprisingly, for most of the last decade, the games where the team piled up the most blocks and steals combined tended to end up in the win column.

2013-2014: 20 games with at least 13 blocks and steals – 18-2 record (10-4 otherwise)

2014-2015: 15 games with at least 14 blocks and steals – 11-4 record (7-9 otherwise)

2015-2016: 16 games with at least 13 blocks and steals – 13-3 record (10-11 otherwise)

2016-2017: 15 games with at least 14 blocks and steals – 11-4 record (8-11 otherwise)

2017-2018: 19 games with at least 12 blocks and steals – 15-4 record (8-10 otherwise)

2018-2019: 10 games with at least 15 blocks and steals – 9-1 record (11-13 otherwise)

2019-2020: 12 games with at least 13 blocks and steals – 10-2 record (8-12 otherwise)

2020-2021: 18 games with at least 12 blocks and steals – 14-4 record (4-6 otherwise)

2021-2022: 13 games with at least 12 blocks and steals – 9-4 record (7-13 otherwise)

2022-2023: 17 games with at least 13 blocks and steals – 11-6 record (6-9 otherwise)

As the total number of blocks and steals rises, so does the team’s winning percentage. All told, in those ten seasons, SU totaled 15 steals and blocks in a game 92 times, rolling up a 78-14 record in those games.

Yes, it is easy to say, “they won games” because they played well. Another thing you can say is, regardless of other factors, when they were able to do specific things well, the Orange were a lot more likely to win than lose.

As the effectiveness of the zone has waned, the team’s record and subsequent postseason success has similarly become worse. Here is where the Orange have finished in adjusted offensive and defensive efficiency at kenpom.com over the last 14 years, along with each season’s final record and postseason result:

2008-2009: #10 on offense, #39 on defense (28-10 overall, NCAA Sweet Sixteen)

2009-2010: #6 on offense, #14 on defense (30-5 overall, NCAA Sweet Sixteen)

2010-2011: #24 on offense, #17 on defense (27-8 overall, NCAA Round of 32)

2011-2012: #7 on offense, #16 on defense (34-3 overall, NCAA Elite Eight)

2012-2013: #26 on offense, #6 on defense (30-10 overall, NCAA Final Four)

2013-2014: #28 on offense, #13 on defense (28-6 overall, NCAA Round of 32)

2014-2015: #117 on offense, #20 on defense (18-13 overall, self-imposed postseason ban)

2015-2016: #50 on offense, #18 on defense (23-14 overall, NCAA Final Four)

2016-2017: #30 on offense, #117 on defense (19-15 overall, NIT second round)

2017-2018: #135 on offense, #5 on defense (23-14 overall, NCAA Sweet Sixteen)

2018-2019: #59 on offense, #30 on defense (20-14 overall, NCAA First Round)

2019-2020: #21 on offense, #116 on defense (18-14 overall, tournament canceled)

2020-2021: #24 on offense, #77 on defense (18-10 overall, NCAA Sweet Sixteen)

2021-2022: #15 on offense, #207 on defense (16-17 overall, missed tournament)

2022-2023: #85 on offense, #190 on defense (17-15 overall, missed tournament)

It is very easy to see that the team’s defensive efficiency is much more important to the squad’s success than offensive efficiency. Only once when the team was in the top 100 of adjusted defensive efficiency did they miss the tournament. SU took a self-imposed postseason ban at the end of the 2014-2015 season, but they were not going to the NCAA Tournament without a significant run in the ACC Tournament from eight-seed.

The four times in those last 15 seasons SU has found themselves outside Ken Pomeroy’s top 100 in defensive efficiency, they have also found themselves outside the NCAA Tournament field (they were not going to make it in the tournament after the 2019-2020 season, either, despite routing the second-worst North Carolina team of the last 65 years by 28 points in the conference tourney). The 2021-2022 team even finished in the top 15 on offense nationally, but the defense completely submarined their efforts.

Those lesser defenses of the last seven years all share some similar traits. The starting lineups for those teams featured multiple players who has at least one of four deficiencies for playing the zone: young or inexperienced in the zone, athletically limited, smaller than ideal size, or focused on offense.

The first of the defenses to finish outside the top 100 in adjusted defensive efficiency was the 2016-2017 team. Point guard was manned by John Gillon, who was in his first year playing the 2-3, was listed at 6’0”, and had more of an eye for the basket than defensive responsibilities. Andrew White III was also in his first year in zone and was more keyed in on offense than defense while playing forward. Taurean Thompson spent a lot of his freshman year (young and inexperienced) struggling on defense, particularly fouling a lot, while showing a lot of interest on offense.

Three years later, Buddy Boeheim was the most experienced guard on the team as a sophomore, playing mostly with freshman Joe Girard III. They were both athletically limited, as well, which would be part of the team’s issues on defense for the next couple seasons, too. Bourama Sidibe was not a classic backstop in the middle of the zone as a slightly undersized option compared to the norm and, when Marek Dolezaj would slide over to the middle, he was even smaller than Sidibe. Freshman Quincy Guerrier was often the one coming in when Sidibe left the floor, which was adding another inexperienced player to the mix.

In 2021-2022, Jimmy Boeheim and Cole Swider transferred in and were the starting forwards, joining Buddy Boeheim and Girard as players who were less athletic than ideal models in the 2-3 zone. Of course, those new forwards were completely new to the zone, as well, no matter how many times Jimmy’s dad had talked about playing zone at the dinner table. When Jesse Edwards went down with an injury for the last month of the season, Frank Anselem, an inexperienced sophomore, filled the center spot.

This past season, Benny Williams entered the season with 333 minutes of game experience at forward. That was more than the rest of the forwards, as Chris Bell, Maliq Brown, Quadir Copeland, and Justin Taylor were the four freshmen who all played on the baseline. That very inexperienced group struggled on defense throughout the season with Brown seeming to develop into the best of the group by the end of the season.

The better SU defenses were manned by players better suited for the zone. The 2017-2018 squad had the 7’2” Paschal Chukwu backstopping the zone with 6’4” junior Frank Howard and 6’5” sophomore Tyus Battle on the top line. Oshae Brissett, Marek Dolezaj and Matthew Moyer were all young, but at least they were the typical size for the zone, all listed at 6’8” or 6’9” and Chukwu’s ability to erase mistakes (a career 12.2 percent block rate at SU) helped cover for them.

The surprise Final Four team of 2015-2016 started with 6’4” senior Trevor Cooney and 6’7” redshirt senior Michael Gbinije on the top line. Malachi Richardson was a 6’6” forward and junior Tyler Roberson 6’8” with 6’8” Tyler Lydon coming off the bench to replace Roberson or the 6’9” DaJuan Coleman. Even though they were mostly young, the taller-than-average backcourt and athletic wings made it difficult for opposing teams, as they had the 7th-best steal rate in the nation.

A recent example of the effectiveness of players on the wing in the zone came at the end of the 2020-2021 season when the Orange made a late push for an NCAA Tournament berth and advanced to the Sweet 16. Forward Robert Braswell and center Jesse Edwards each received an increase in playing time in the final games of the season, including in both the ACC and NCAA Tournaments. (Edwards enabled starting center Marek Dolezaj to move to his more natural position of forward for some stretches of play while providing a shotblocking threat inside.)

Braswell logged 175 of his 290 minutes on the season in the final ten games while Edwards saw 112 of his 160 minutes on the season in last eight contests. Most of their play came at the expense of starting forwards Alan Griffin and Quincy Guerrier with Braswell often replacing Griffin on the floor. Griffin, a more offensive-minded player in his first year in the program after transferring in from Illinois, found himself on a tighter leash, particularly in the loss to Virginia in the conference tourney and all three NCAA contests.

Griffin struggled on offense in those four games (eight points on 1-for 13 shooting in 51 minutes of play) and Jim Boeheim quickly turned to Braswell, a player who, with a brief exception early in the season, was primarily a defensive specialist. The Orange responded particularly well to Braswell’s presence, outscoring Virginia (+7) and San Diego State (+15) with him on the floor. They also held West Virginia to 36.2 percent shooting with Braswell at forward until the final minute when the Mountaineers relied on fouling and quick shots to attempt a final comeback.

In six of the final seven outings of the season, SU’s zone held their opponents to an adjusted offensive efficiency ranking under 100 with Virginia’s 102.5 being the lone exception. Even in getting waxed by Houston in the Sweet Sixteen, the Orange turned in their best defensive effort of the season against a major conference foe, posting an adjusted defensive efficiency of 81.4.

Braswell clearly helped bring out the best of the 2-3 zone, especially in comparison to Griffin. To be fair, Braswell also had the most consistently good shooting of his Syracuse career during this span. Braswell shot 16-of-27 (59.3 percent) from the field overall and 9-of-18 from three (50.0 percent) in the seven games prior to the team’s postseason elimination at the hands of Houston (he shot 25.0 percent overall and 20.5 percent from three the remainder of the season).

At the same time, in those final seven games, Braswell averaged 8.5 field goal attempts per 40 minutes. Griffin averaged 14.9 shots per 40 minutes on the season and 12.9 shots per 40 minutes in those final seven games while on a short leash in many of them. Braswell’s willingness to play a defense-first role, particularly during Buddy Boeheim’s scorching hot shooting streak (26.0 points per game on 54.0 percent shooting and 48.5 percent from three before Houston stifled him), was a key to the Orange going on a run late in that season.

The 2-3 zone has always played a significant role in how the coaching staff has recruited. After all, there was a way the aforementioned cliché, the “prototypical Syracuse forward,” came into being.

Through the entire Jim Boeheim coaching era, one of the hallmarks of roster-building was bringing in the majority of players who were not the elites of their recruiting classes, but those who ranged more from #30-100 in the rankings or lower. There were, of course, exceptions like Carmelo Anthony, but the bulk of the players that have come to SU are not five-star players.

Most of these players embodied several of the traits needed to play the zone successfully. Tall, lanky forwards who could touch the sky. Long-armed guards who could bother both passers and shooters. Tall centers who could take up space in the middle while denying passing lanes and deterring shooters.

Another trait that came with these players was that they were expected to be on campus for multiple seasons. Since most players were not at the top end of their recruiting classes, they were expected to come to SU, develop physically, learn the zone, and eventually grow into a role on the floor.

As such, while he rarely used every scholarship at his disposal, rosters under Jim Boeheim often had a couple young players at the end of them. Those youngsters were learning in practice and working to be ready for their eventual roles in the future.

And then…

Probably the biggest thing to happen to the Syracuse basketball program in the last decade happened. The Orange were punished by the NCAA in the spring of 2015 with the most noteworthy penalty being the loss of eight total scholarships over four years. The Orange opted to lose three scholarships in the 2015-2016 season, two in each of the next two seasons, and one in the 2018-2019 season.

While shortening the roster from 13 players down to 11 or even ten does not sound like an exceptionally harsh penalty, particularly for a coach like Jim Boeheim who often relies on a short rotation, there are other things that exacerbate that limited roster. Early declarations for the NBA draft and players transferring out of the program are just two of them, but they generally have the same effect.

Before the scholarship reductions, when Tyler Ennis was recruited to SU, it was not expected that he would be a one-and-done player. Jerami Grant was also viewed as a developmental player and that he would be on the roster for multiple years. Both ended up declaring for the draft after Syracuse was ousted from the tournament in 2014. And with their departures coming so late, the Orange were left with no option to replace them for the following year, which ended with an 18-13 record.

A couple years later, after the scholarship penalties were in effect, Malachi Richardson jumped to the NBA and Kaleb Joseph transferred out of the program. SU turned to a pair of graduate transfers to fill the holes they created, adding Andrew White and John Gillon as a pair of one-year emergency fixes.

After the following season, Tyler Lydon declared for the draft and Taurean Thompson departs the program. Fortunately, the Orange had a four-man incoming class of recruits and Geno Thorpe to make it nine active players on scholarship… until Thorpe left the program before the conference schedule started up.

In each of these cases, particularly while SU was dealing with a shorthanded roster, the early departures exacerbated that situation. Each player departing early was drafted into the NBA with Grant as the lone player lasting to the second round, so they all made very defensible decisions. But those holes in the Syracuse roster could not easily be filled.

In fact, when those players all left the Orange, they left nothing in their place except a suddenly available scholarship. There is nothing left in the roster spot, whether it had been filled by a star player, a rotation guy, or even a young player who is working on his game in practice. No player, no practice in the zone, no experience in the offensive sets, not a single practice drill. Nothing.

And, even when those available scholarships were filled, in many cases, the new faces were not ideal fits for the 2-3 zone, especially when you take into account that incoming transfers had zero experience playing it before arriving on campus. In fact, most incoming transfers can be filed in one of two categories: older, offensive-minded guard/wing as a patch job for the current season or younger, defense-first center as a developmental project for down the line.

Here is a list of incoming transfers during the last decade with their class when they enrolled:

Paschal Chukwu – sophomore, had to redshirt

John Gillon – graduate transfer

Andrew White III – graduate transfer

Geno Thorpe – graduate transfer

Elijah Hughes – sophomore, had to redshirt

Alan Griffin – junior (portal)

Jimmy Boeheim - graduate transfer

Cole Swider – senior (portal)

Symir Torrence – junior (portal)

Mounir Hima – sophomore (portal)

Eight of those ten players fit nicely into those two aforementioned groups. Gillon, White, Thorpe, Griffin, Boeheim, and Swider all came in as veterans to provide offensive firepower, ideally enough to offset their defensive shortcomings in the zone. All but Thorpe did so as starters and all but Griffin joined the program with just one year of eligibility left.

Chukwu and Hima, however, both came to Syracuse with three years of eligibility left. The former developed into a shotblocking force to backstop the zone and Hima showed in his first season that he has the potential to do the same.

The exceptions to these two groups? Hughes and Torrence. Hughes came to SU prior to the transfer portal and had to sit a year as a redshirt and learn the zone in practice, while Torrence returned to his hometown to play and was a solid option off the bench in his two seasons on campus. He, of course, has opted to enter the portal once again for his last year of eligibility, once again leaving nothing in his place except an available scholarship.

While Torrence is departing to use his year of eligibility granted by the pandemic, lots of other players have also left through the portal. After the 2020-2021 season, the Orange lost Robert Braswell, Quincy Guerrier, Woody Newton, and Kadary Richmond through the portal (as well as Alan Griffin, who declared for the NBA draft). Braswell had just finished his redshirt sophomore season, Guerrier had been a two-year starter, and Newton and Richmond had spent a season with the Orange.

Richmond had played the most of the non-starters that year, fitting into a third guard role from the beginning of the season while Braswell and Newton spent most of the year on the pine, particularly during ACC play, until the former got on his hot streak. The reason all three departed? The simple desire for more playing time.

Newton, who had shown some potential early in the season with some hot perimeter shooting, looked like a future contributor at small forward, but left town for Oklahoma State. Richmond wanted an even larger opportunity and jumped to a starting role at Seton Hall. Braswell was hoping to play more before his eligibility elapsed and opted to go to Charlotte.

As a result of those five leaving, including four through the portal, the Orange had no option but to head to the portal themselves and pick up a couple players to fill out their roster, as both starting forwards and their sixth man were gone. They ended up with Jimmy Boeheim and Cole Swider, a couple of one-year patch jobs whose offensive capabilities gave reason to lean on trying to win with three-point shooting.

It is not too hard to come to the conclusion that the transfer portal is very likely to kill the 2-3 zone at Syracuse. Incoming coach Adrian Autry said that the team would still play some zone while still playing man-to-man, but the 2-3’s days are clearly numbered.

Very few players are willing to stay on the bench at a school for multiple seasons, developing in practice and mostly just watching games. The transfer portal would almost certainly would keep the bench short unless SU switches to having more of their targets in high school recruiting to lower-rated players who will need to develop more of their abilities. And no one the Orange could bring in was fluent in the 2-3.

Frankly, the 2-3 zone was not the problem the last several years. If you have made it this far, you should know there is a basket load of data points from the last decade that show it still works.

The personnel playing the zone, however, was the problem. The combination of early departures and scholarship penalties created a situation where there was essentially zero margin of error when it came to roster management. Thus, every small thing that did not work out

Do not interpret this as “players who could have left for the NBA should have stayed at Syracuse.” Every single player who declared early for the draft late in the season when they could not have been replaced with a recruit was drafted in the first round except Jerami Grant, who has turned out to be the best of that entire group (Tyler Ennis, Chris McCulloch, Malachi Richardson, Tyler Lydon) and Oshae Brissett, who has worked his way into a longer NBA career than any of the other four of that group except Ennis (they each have four years in the NBA).

Jim Boeheim’s decision to not have a full complement of scholarship players when under NCAA punishment does not look great in retrospect. In the last three years of the NCAA penalties, SU entered the season with an available scholarship unused. Even bringing in a developmental player could have helped. It is not a certainty, but was probably worth a try.

The 2017-2018 season is an outlier in that time that goes unnoticed as one of the better coaching jobs of Jim Boeheim’s career, but that squad still used only ten of a possible 11 scholarships, including one on a redshirting Elijah Hughes and another on Geno Thorpe, who left the team before the end of November. Boeheim turned two juniors, a sophomore, and four freshmen into an elite defensive team that played at a snail’s pace all the way into the Sweet Sixteen, where they lost by four points to Duke.

Otherwise, the decision to go into seasons short-handed did not pay off, as the team got an NIT berth one year and got knocked out on the first round of the NCAA’s the other.

Things were even worse the following season when it should have been getting back to normal. Brissett’s early departure meant only 11 scholarship players were on the roster the first time they could have been back at full strength. As a result, Quincy Guerrier was thrust into the six-man role and Joe Girard III grabbed the point guard spot after Jalen Carey broke his thumb. The team was pretty good that season, but things quickly got worse.

Carey, Brycen Goodine, and even Howard Washington all transferred out, leaving Girard and Buddy Boeheim as the only scholarship guards on the roster, kicking open the transfer portal door. Robert Braswell, Quincy Guerrier, Kadary Richmond and Woody Newton ripped it off the hinges after the following season, making enough room for Alan Griffin to follow out when he declared for the draft and Jimmy Boeheim and Cole Swider to ease through it on the way in.

The roster has been in flux since.

The program, which historically relied on the stability provided by the 2-3 zone and the way it produced strong defensive team after strong defensive team, was left unmoored.

The evidence is there. When the zone played well, creating steals and blocks while also forcing opponents into lower three-point shooting, the team won games. A lot of them.

They did not need offensive explosions to win games, just enough reliable production to get into the win column. Dominating on the glass was not required, just not getting dominated was.

The defense has just not generally been there frequently enough in recent seasons, even when they have had a full roster.

First of all, Syracuse needs to scrap the 2-3 zone defense, but not because it is ineffective or it cannot keep up with the modern trend of increased three-point shooting in basketball. They need to get rid of it because players do not stay at SU long enough to become proficient at how it is supposed to be played. And every player who leaves the Orange leaves nothing behind them, particularly how to play the zone properly.

At the time of this writing, Judah Mintz is still testing the NBA draft waters and Joe Girard III is trying to figure out which will be his next school. That leaves Benny Williams, Mounir Hima, and the other five players who were freshmen last season returning to the team, making a total of seven players coming back to the Orange with at least one year on the roster.

The last time Syracuse had seven scholarship players return to the program? The 2020-2021 season, which included Bourama Sidibe, who ended up missing all but 15 minutes of the season due to injury. If Mintz returns, they would have eight returnees for the first time since the 2011-2012 season, which is a few seasons before the aforementioned NCAA punishment and scholarship losses.

In other words, they could actually have a team that has enough experience in the zone to potentially play it well… right when they should be tossing it out the window. And before you immediately respond about how bad they were last season, the personnel now match the preferred physical attributes of taller, rangier athletes and now has some experience that was lacking at the start of last season. There is no guarantee they would be a top-end defensive unit playing the 2-3, but they would certainly profile as a much better defense based solely on personnel.

Moving on from the zone defense also eases adding players from the transfer portal. Any player can be added without worrying about the qualifier of “no experience playing our defense.” The program can expand its target base in the portal from just long-term center projects and one-year offensive fixes to literally anyone they choose. As the portal increases in importance when it comes to building a roster, maximizing the list of potential targets only makes sense.

On the other side of that coin, any player departing through the portal is a lesser loss because the departure is not taking experience in the zone defense out the door, as well.

Regarding NIL and Syracuse’s recent issues with it, who can accurately say what the Orange specifically need? (“More” is not specific.) So much of NIL as a whole is done quietly, it is hard to imagine a truly accurate picture of what exists for the Orange basketball program.

All things considered, Jim Boeheim’s departure from the program should really be treated as a clean break. With the transfer portal and NIL quickly becoming the forces they already have in

college basketball, handing the program over to Adrian Autry at this time is probably also good timing.

It’s a brave new world out there. Hopefully, Syracuse can withstand entering it.

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